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NOTES
Antitrust Law-United States v. General Dynamics: Toward an
Analytical Approach to Post-Acquisition Evidence
It has been suggested by some of the more audacious legal com-
mentators that the Government cannot lose a suit under section 7 of
the Clayton Act.1  The antitrust enforcement agencies have an unfair
advantage over the section 7 defendant, it is urged, because under the
time-of-suit doctrine2 they may utilize evidence of events that 'have
occurred between the -time of the challenged acquisition and trial to
establish the probable anti-competitive effects of the acquisition, while
such post-acquisition evidence tending to reflect favorably upon the
corporate defendant's position has been held to be of limited probative
value.4  One of the primary justifications advanced for the disparate
treatment accorded post-acquisition evidence is that defendants are
likely to Tefrain deliberately from engaging in anti-competitive conduct
prior to the time the suit is filed to establish the lack of future anti-
competitive potential of the acquisition.3
1. Solomon, Why Uncle Sam Can't Lose a Case Under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 53 A.B.AJ. 137, 140-41 (1967). Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1970) reads as follows:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in corn-
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create
a monopoly.
2. See text accompanying notes 29-33 infra. For a fuller discussion of this doc-
trine see Barnes, Competitive Mores and Legal Tests in Merger Cases: The Du Pont-
General Motors Decision, 46 GEo. L.. 564 (1958); Subcommittee on Section 7, The
Backward Sweep Theory and the Oligopoly Problem, 32 Ara~usT LJ. 306 (1966).
3. In view of the Clayton Act's purpose of arresting mergers when the trend to-
ward a lessening of competition in a line of commerce is in its incipiency, the standard
for establishing a violation of the Act is one of "probability." See Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962); S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1914).
4. See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Consol-
idated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378
U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963);
United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Hawaii
1972). See also text accompanying notes 34-42 infra.
5. See Note, Post-Acquisition Evidence and Conglomerate Mergers, 46 N.C.L.
Rv. 366, 369 (1968); text accompanying notes 39-40 infra.
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The United States Supreme Court recognized this consideration
in United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,6 but at the same time criti-
cized the past approach as giving -the Government a "heads-I-win, tails-
you-lose" advantage over section 7 defendants. In upholding a merger
exclusively on the basis of post-acquisition evidence, the Court indi-
cated that such evidence diminishing the probable anti-competitive ef-
fect of an acquisition may be given controlling significance when it re-
flects substantial changes in market structure, not likely to have been
the product of the defendant's deliberate manipulation.
7
THE GENERAL DYNAMIvcs CASE
General Dynamics arose out of a 1959 horizontal merger8 in the
Midwestern coal industry, that occurred when Freeman Coal Mining
Corporation acquired United Electric Coal Company.' In 1967 the Jus-
tice Department sued under section 7 of the Clayton Act, charging that
Freeman's acquisition had the probable effect of substantially lessening
competition in the production and sale of coal in the relevant geo-
graphic markets.' 0 As evidence of the violation, the Government
relied primarily upon statistics indicating that the merged company con-
trolled a market share comparable to those that had been found in prior
cases to be violative of section 7."1 The statistics also revealed a
marked trend toward industry concentration in the relevant markets.1 2
A sharply divided Supreme Court, while acknowledging the past
instances in which statistical showings comparable to the one offered by
the Government were sufficient to make out a case requiring divesti-
tare,'" held by a vote of five to four that the Freeman-United Electric
merger did not pose a substantial threat to competition at the time of
6. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
7. Id. at 506.
8. "A horizontal merger involves the acquisition by one company of all or part
of the stock or assets of a competitor which offers the same goods or services in the
same market area." E. KINTNER, AN ANTrnRUST PRIMER 88 (1964).
9. Shortly thereafter Freeman was acquired by defendant General Dynamics, but
the legality of this acquisition was never at issue.
10. These markets consisted of the State of Illinois and the Eastern Interior Coal
Province Sales Area (EICP). The EICP is one of four major coal distribution areas
recognized by the coal industry, comprising Illinois, Indiana, and parts of Kentucky,
Tennessee, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Missouri. 415 U.S. at 490.
11. See note 24 infra. For a more detailed review of some of these cases and the
criteria generally relied upon in assessing the competitive effect of a merger see note
23 infra.
12. See note 24 infra.
13. 415 U.S. at 496.
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suit, "[i]rrespective of the markets within which the acquiring and the
acquired company might be viewed."' 4  In reaching this conclusion,
the majority relied heavily on factors relating to the structure and pre-
vailing business customs of the coal industry, with particular emphasis
on post-acquisition evidence of United Electric's depleted coal reserves.
Specifically, the majority noted 'that electric utility companies to-
day consume the great bulk of the coal produced in -this country. 15
Moreover, the flow of coal from the mines to these utilities is largely
governed by long-term "requirements contracts,"' 6 often lasting for as
long a period as the parties remain productive. In rejecting the Gov-
ernment's prima facie case based on past coal production statistics, the
majority reasoned that the true indicator of a coal company's ability to
affect competition lay in its ability to negotiate new long-term contracts
with the utilities. The fact that a coal company accounts for a large
percentage of the production in a particular market proves nothing
about its ability to affect prices if the bulk of such production is already
committed at a constant price under existing long-term contracts. The
majority accepted the district court's finding that at the time the suit
was brought United Electric's coal reserves were depleted to the extent
that it lacked the resources necessary to compete for future long-term
contracts' 7 and that new reserves were unavailable for acquisition.' 8 It
followed that its divestiture would not affect -the vigor of competition
in any market.' 9
14. Id. at 511. Interestingly, the Court did not reach the market issues in its opin-
ion. For that reason an analysis of the relevant product and geographic markets is out-
side the scope of this note. Suffice to say that it is highly unusual for a determination
of the competitive effect of a merger to be made without a prior determination of the
markets in which to judge such effect.
15. Id. at 499. See generally R. MoYER, COMNEITrION 1N T-E MDWESTERN COAL
INDUSTRY 41 (1964).
16. Due to the large capital investment required in the construction of a power
generating plant, it is essential to the electric utility that a flow of coal sufficient to
meet its needs be guaranteed in advance to the greatest extent practicable. Requirements
contracts similarly benefit the coal producer by assuring an outlet for his production.
17. 415 U.S. at 503.
18. Id. at 509. Since United Electric was a strip mining company, the majority
discounted the availability of deep reserves in reaching this conclusion.
19. The Government contended that this "weak reserve" argument was essentially
a "failing company" defense and that the defendants should have been required to con-
form to the strict limitations placed on its use. The failing company defense, first es-
poused by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930),
is an affirmative defense that, if sustained, will validate a merger, despite anti-competi-
tive effects, if the acquired company faces a grave probability of business failure unless
the merger takes place and if it can be shown that no other prospective purchaser was
available. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969). The ma-
jority rejected this contention, however, on the grounds that the failing company defense
1975] 537
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
Finally, and most significantly, the majority rejected the assertion
that its reliance on United Electric's weak coal reserves at the time of
suit placed undue emphasis on post-acquisition evidence.2" While
recognizing an "obvious" need for a limitation on the weight accorded
such evidence, -the majority felt that the practical considerations under-
lying -this limitation were inapplicable to the present case.21  The evi-
dence of weak reserves, it was held, "could not reflect a positive de-
cision on the part of the merged companies to deliberately but tempor-
arily refrain from anti-competitive actions. 22  Thus, by upholding the
merger, the Court indicated that a defendant's post-acquisition evi-
dence may be given controlling weight in defending a merger subjected
to section 7 attack. This result was reached notwithstanding the fact
that had post-acquisition evidence not been considered, the Freeman-
United Electric merger almost certainly would have been dissolved un-
der the criteria generally relied upon to determine a section 7 viola-
tion.21 The Government's undisputed statistical showing casts con-
is a "lesser of two evils" approach, which presupposes an adverse effect on competition,
but permits a merger because even worse consequences would presumably accrue both
to competition, and to the community in which the failing company is located, if it is
forced to go out of business as an alternative to merger. Rather than establishing a
failing company defense, the majority reasoned, the evidence of United Electric's weak
reserves was relevant to the initial question of whether there would be an adverse effect
on competition to begin with, and established that there would not be.
20. For cases limiting the probative value of post-acquisition evidence tending to
diminish the probability of anti-competitive effects see cases cited note 4 supra.
21. See -text accompanying notes 35-42 infra.
22. 415 U.S. at 506. The dissenters disagreed with this factual conclusion, citing
the ready availability of deep reserves and United Electrie's acquisition of substantial
amounts of these reserves. Id. at 524 & n.21 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
23. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962). Market
shares were conceded to be the primary index of market power, but other important cri-
teria included the degree of concentration already existing in the market, whether a trend
toward concentration over a longer time span was discernible, and the ease of entry of
new competitors into the market. In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963), the Supreme Court found a merger that produced a firm controlling a 30%
share of the market to be presumptively illegal where the market concentration was al-
ready high before the merger. The Court stated that "we think that a merger which
produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and re-
sults in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so inher-
ently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absenco
of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anti-competitive
effects." Id. at 363. The Court further warned that "if concentration is already great,
the importance of preventing even slight increases in concentration . . . is correspond-
ingly great." Id. at 365 n.42. See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546
(1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Con-
tinental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); Maryland & Va. Milk Prod. Ass'n, Inc. v.
United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960). But see United States v. Crowell, Collier & Mac-
millan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (merger was upheld despite a high de-
gree of market concentration and a 42.5% market share on the part of the merged
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siderable light on this conclusion.24
POST-ACQUISITION EVIDENCE AND "COMPETITIVE EFFECTS"
The role that post-acquisition evidence 'has played in assessing
whether a merger poses a substantial threat to competition has been
a source of controversy. Some feel that such evidence is the best evi-
dence available at the -time of suit, and, therefore, both parties should
be permitted to use it to remove section 7 determinations from the
realm of speculation. 5 On the other hand, this evidence has been dis-
counted as of little probative value to either side,26 and, in any case,
contrary to the specific statutory language of section 7, which defines
-a violation in terms of the initial acquisition, and not in terms of what
later occurred.2 7  While the state of the law prior to General Dynamics
represented neither of these extremes, it has pleased few legal com-
mentators and even fewer corporate defendants.2
The Supreme Court in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co.2 9 first sanctioned the Government's use of post-acquisition evi-
dence by holding 'that the probability that an acquisiton is likely to
restrain competition is viewed as of the time of the antitrust suit rather
company). See generally von Kalinowski, Section 7 and Competitive Effects, 48 VA.
L. REv. 827 (1962).
24. At the time of the merger the two firms produced 12.4% of the coal mined
in the EICP market and 23.2% in the Illinois market. This is a far larger market share
than the 5% found illegal in Brown Shoe, and in Illinois it approaches the 30% share
found presumptively illegal in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321
(1963). The Government bolstered its case by introducing post-acquisition evidence of
a substantial increase in concentration in the market as well. The number of coal pro-
ducing firms in Illinois decreased a dramatic 73% between 1957-1967, from 144 produc-
ers to 39. 415 U.S. at 494-95. Although unmentioned by the Government the once
easy access of new firms into the coal industry no longer exists. The capital require-
ments necessary for entry have increased, as the existing firms have become increasingly
mechanized and concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. Desirable reserves are also less
accessible than they once were. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 77
(10th Cir. 1972); R. MoYER, supra note 15, at 119.
25. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 605-06 (1965) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
26. See Proctor & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1534 (1963) (2d opinion of the
FTC), a! 'd, 386 U.S. 568 (1967). The Commission mounted a multi-faceted attack
on the use of post-acquisition evidence by either party, citing the possibility of frequent
remands for further such evidence until the proceedings became so protracted as to pre-
cude effective relief. Id. at 1559.
27. See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 5.68, 592-93 (1967) (Harlan, I.,
concurring); Neal, The Clayton Act and the Transamerica Case, 5 STAN. L. REv. 179,
220-21 (1953).
28. See, e.g., Note, Postacquisition Evidence and Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A
Study in Judicial Legislation, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 434 (1967).
29. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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than 'the time of the acquisition itself. Since the Clayton Act has no
applicable statute of limitations, the time of suit can be thirty years after
the acquisition, as was the case in DuPont. Thus, DuPont implicitly
recognized that the Government may make use of post-acquisition evi-
dence in claiming that an acquisition, apparently harmless to competi-
tion when made, has since threatened to pose the prohibited "substan-
tial anti-competitive effect." 0  While this rule has been criticized, 3' it
-has been justified as advancing the avowed Clayton Act policy of curb-
ing monopolistic trends in their formative stages,3 2 regardless of how
long after an acquisition such a trend becomes apparent.3 3 Critics feel,
however, that a double standard is in operation because the courts and
the FTC have consistently held that post-acquisition evidence may
not be accorded substantial weight when it is used by the defendant
to show the lack of anti-competitive consequence of the merger.1
4
This disparity is not intended as an arbitrary handicap to section 7 de-
fendants: there are four justifications for its continued viability.
In FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp. 5 the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that the use of post-acquisition evidence by a defendant
was not -totally precluded, but it reversed a lower court decision for
placing undue emphasis36 on market conditions as they existed after
the challenged merger had been consummated. In this decision the
Court emphasized that the prohibition of section 7 is determined by
probabilities, not by what later transpired. If the existence or non-
existence of actual anti-competitive effects were allowed to override
the probability of such an occurrence existing at the time of suit, the
policy of curbing such effects in their incipiency would be frustrated.
3 7
Consolidated Foods further pointed out that "once the two com-
panies are united, no one knows what the fate of the acquired company
and its competitors would have been but for the merger." 38  Thus,
even if competitive market conditions do not appear to have been ad-
30. See id. at 607.
31. Id. at 620 (Burton, J., dissenting).
32. S. REP. No. 698, supra note 3.
33. But see United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 620
(Burton, J., dissenting).
34. See cases cited note 4 supra. But see Day, Conglomerate Mergers and "The
Curse of Bigness", 42 N.C.L. REv. 511 (1964); Solomon, supra note 1.
35. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
36. Id. at 598; see FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 576-77 (1967).
37. 380 U.S. at 598; see FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 576-77
(1967).
3. 3&0 U.S. at 598. Bgt tee id. at 606 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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versely affected by a merger, the possibility exists that competition
would have been better off had there been no merger at all. Since
post-acquisition evidence would shed little light on what market condi-
tions would have been but for the merger, its defensive use should be
limited.
A third justification for limiting the probative value of post-ac-
quisition evidence is the "best-behavior" rationale. 39 If it were within
the power of the defendant not to engage in anti-competitive conduct
up to the time of suit, he should not be able to point to the absence
of such conduct, which may be of limited duration, in order -to validate
the acquisition.
40
A final and somewhat weaker justification was advanced by the
FTC in Reynolds Metals Co.41 The Commission refused to reopen a
divestiture case -to consider post-acquisition evidence on the grounds
that "[e]ven though subsequent events may show that future competi-
tive conditions are not as anticipated, this would not make legal that
which was illegal. . . as of the time of trial.
'42
Faced with this background and with a merger that was apparently
illegal in 1959, the essential question before the Supreme Court in
1974 was whether to take cognizance of significant changes in market
structure that had occurred in the fifteen year interim, apparently
beyond the control of the defendants, -tending to indicate that at the
time of suit .there no longer existed a threat to competition as a result
of the 1959 merger. As seen, the Court gave controlling weight to
these post-acquisition changes, in the form of United Electric's de-
pleted reserves 'and its inability to negotiate new long term contracts
as a result.43  In doing so, the Court indicated that relevant economic
data unrelated to the defendant's post-acquisition behavior will not be
subjected to the usual limitations merely on the basis of its classification
as post-acquisition evidence.44  In this respect, the General Dynamics
holding is a sound one, for there is no justification for a restriction on
39. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
40. See Note, 46 N.C.L. REv., supra note 5; text accompanying note 4-7 infra.
41. 56 F.T.C. 1680 (1960).
42. Id. at 1681. If the evidence sought to be introduced is viewed as bearing on
the probability of a substantial lessening of competition at the time of suit, then the
FTC's reasoning is circular. Evidence proving that the merger was in fact legal at the
time of suit is inadmissible contends the Commission, since the merger was illegal.
43. The dissent emphasized that post-acquisition evidence can be used at most to
influence the time of acquisition findings, but that none were ever made by the district
court. 415 U.S. at 524 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. See Note, 46 N.C.L. REv., supra note 5, at 378.
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the use of post-acquisition evidence absent the usual reasons for apply-
ing such a restriction.
In the General Dynamics setting, the Court felt that it was beyond
United Electric's power to remedy its depleted reserves, a circumstance
-the company was unlikely -to have created intentionally. Accepting
this factual premise,4 the "best-behavior" rationale for limiting the
probative value of the depleted reserve evidence loses its force since
it presupposes conditions capable of the defendant's manipulation in
his own self interest. However, when manipulative capabilities exist
the defendant's use of post-acquisition evidence may be discounted for
reasons analogous to the suspicion with which self-serving statements
are generally viewed. 47  At the same time, however, the efficacy of
the "best-behavior" rationale should be viewed in terms of an analytical
distinction between the case in which the source of an acquisition's
probable anti-competitive effect lies in the defendant's ability to engage
in specific prohibited conduct"' and the case in which such source lies
in a more general effect on market structure as a whole.4 In the
former situation the newly acquired potential to engage in anti-com-
petitive behavior makes the acquisition illegal, regardless of the de-
fendant's motive or actual conduct. Here it should avail the defendant
little 'to point to the absence of actual anti-competitive behavior after
the acquisition, because of the likelihood ,that he has been on his "best
behavior."
The "best-behavior" rationale has little applicability, however, to
the case in which an acquisition violates section 7 by contributing to
an increasingly oligopolistic market structure. Here the defendant's
good behavior is irrelevant because the Government's case is not
dependent on his particular opportunity 'to engage in anti-competitive
45. See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
46. But see note 22 supra.
47. See 6 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENcE § 1732 (1940); Note, 46 N.C.L. Rnv., su-
pra note 5, at 376-77. Contra, Handler, Recent Antitrust Developinents-1965, 40
N.Y.U.L. REv. 823, 843-44 (1965); Note, 36 U. CIN. L. R ., supra note 28.
48. This concern is most often encountered with conglomerate mergers, where the
acquiror enters a new market for the first time by acquiring an already existing com-
petitor in that market. Since obviously there is no effect on market shares or concentra-
tion as a result of such a merger, specific anti-competitive practices become the focus
of the section 7 charge. See, e.g., FIC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967)
(predatory pricing); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) (reciproc-
ity); Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (price leadership).
49. Violations of section 7 are most often found on the basis of changes in market
structure in horizontal and vertical mergers, where the merging firms were involved in
the same market prior to merger, either as competitors (horizontal) or as suppliers or
customers of one another (vertical). -
542 [Vol. 53
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conduct. Rather, the violation stems from a sound recognition that
oligopolistic market structure tends ,to cause all the firms in a market
to engage in economic cooperation rather than competition. Thus
there is no need to apply the "best-behavior" rationale to limit the de-
fendant's post-acquisition evidence of his own good behavior; it is suf-
ficient that the use of such evidence as a defense fails to meet the thrust
of the Governmenfs attack.
The Supreme Court in General Dynamics looked carefully at the
context in which the Freeman-United Electric merger took place in
finding inapplicable still another rationale for limiting its consideration
of post-acquisition evidence. Although this evidence apparently estab-
lished United Electric as a non-viable competitive force at the time of
suit, the acquisition of which could not adversely affect competition,
the majority refused 'to adopt placidly the argument that had the
merger never taken place competition might have been even more
vigorous than it was. The problem with this approach, as the majority
asserted, is that the factors that relegated United Electric to its present
position were the product of inevitable forces5" on the coal industry
throughout the country. Therefore, the Court could conclude with
some confidence that the structure of the market would not have been
significantly different had the merger never occurred. 51
The peculiar factual context of General Dynamics renders inap-
plicable another often cited reason for limiting the probative value of
post-acquisition evidence. Generally, it is true that, if 'the lack of con-
crete anti-competitive effects could be relied upon to defeat a divesti-
ture action, the policy of curbing monopolistic trends before they mani-
fest themselves in actual monopolistic action would be frustrated. The
post-acquisition evidence relied upon by General Dynamics, however,
had nothing to do with the absence of past anti-competitive symptoms.
Rather, the evidence of depleted reserves bore on the probability of
a future lessening of competition at the time of suit,52 irrespective of
the fact that had the Government acted promptly in bringing suit in
1959, the merger might have been found illegal at that time. Thus,
an important distinction to apply in determining the weight of the de-
fendant's post-acquisition evidence is whether this evidence bears on
the future probabilities existing at the time of suit, or merely on what
occurred prior to the suit, but after -the acquisition.
50. See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra.
51. 415 U.S. at 506.
52. Id.
1975]
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There was nothing theoretically objectionable about the Court's
reliance on post-acquisition evidence in General Dynamics from the
standpoint of -the policies underlying the restrictions generally placed
on the probative value of such evidence. Indeed, courts ought to be
more analytical in their approach to post-acquisition evidence and less
prone to rely on rules that limit the value of this evidence without regard
to the circumstances of the particular case. The inquiry should not be
ended, however, by a determination that the reasons for generally
limiting the probative value of post-acquisition evidence are not pres-
ent. Cases may arise in which, despite the absence of objections to
the use of post-acquisition evidence, -the value of this evidence is out-
weighed by other factors indicating that general antitrust policies would
be furthered by an order of divestiture. One such cogent policy is the
need to prevent oligopoly in a natural Tesource extraction industry,
where demand is constant, but the supply is capable of being tightly
controlled, as the oil producing nations recently illustrated. In the
General Dynamics context, perhaps the Supreme Court should have
considered the possibility that the trend toward oligopoly in the coal
industry would be enhanced by Freeman's acquisition of the substantial
assets of United Electric, regardless of the latter's ability to compete
independently in the market.5 3 Generally, however, when antitrust
policies do not militate against the merger, post-acquisition evidence
supporting it should be capable of being accorded controlling weight
in appropriate circumstances.
While the Supreme Court in General Dynamics may have sig-
nalled the adoption of a new approach to post-acquisition evidence in
section 7 cases, it may have inadvertantly issued another signal to
would-be oligopolists. Those who may have been deterred by past
Government success in section 7 litigation may now proceed with ques-
tionable mergers in the hope that fortuitous events outside the control
of the parties will later occur to validate these mergers. Prudent
businessmen will take a careful look at the unusual facts of General
Dynamics before embarking on such a course. The Government is not
always going to wait long enough before attacking a merger to allow
later occurrences to validate it.
CONCLUSION
In preserving competition by curbing oligopolistic market struc-
53. Cf. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Eco-
nomics, 74 HAv. L. Rlv. 226, 340 (1960).
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ture, the Government should be able to utilize whatever evidence is
available in bringing suit under section 7 of the Clayton Act." Prac-
tical as well as policy considerations, however, prevent a section 7 de-
fendant from enjoying a similar latitude. This in itself does not mean
that the Government enjoys a "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" advantage
over its adversaries, for often the restrictions placed on the defendant's
use of post-acquisition evidence will be completely justifiable, for, rea-
sons not applicable to similar use by a prosecuting authority. Where
courts have automatically applied restrictive shibboleths to the de-
fendant's use of such evidence, however, this criticism has had some
validity. Hopefully the Supreme Court in General Dynamics has abdi-
cated such a rigid approach for the future, in favor of a more discrim-
inating analysis.
RAYMOND M. BERNSTEIN
Constitutional Law-Gilmore v. City of Montgomery: Is There
More to Equal Protection Than State Action?
Ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 guaranteed that
"[n]o State shall . . .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."1 Fifteen years later the United States
Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases "embedded in our constitu-
tional law' 2 the principle "that the action inhibited by the . . . [equal
protection clause] is only such action as may fairly be said to be that
of the States. That amendment erects no shield against merely pri-
vate conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful."13  Thus a viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment necessitates a finding of two factors.4
First, it requires a finding of state action.5 Secondly, there must be
a finding of a substantive denial of equal protection, a denial that must
54. Contra, Neal, supra note 27.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948), citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883).
3. Id.
4. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
5. Note, Private Clubs: Freedom of Association Overlooked in Effort to Guar-
antee Equal Protection, 23 SYRAcusE L. Rnv. 905, 910 (1972); see Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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